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It seems generally accepted that when trust exists life is more pleasant than when it is 
absent or in short supply.  Even within the realm of economic theory this idea is not 
new.  It was central to the thinking of Adam Smith and David Hume who both 
thought the spread of trust throughout a community an essential part of the 
development process (Bruni and Sugden (2000)).  More recently it has been linked to 
the success of institutions (La Porta et al (1997) and financial development (Guisio et 
al. (2004)).  An extensive experimental literature (see Sapienza et al (2013) and the 
references therein) suggests there exists a significant level of trust among individuals.  
Within the realm of public economics it is possible that trust can explain in some way 
why laboratory experiments and econometric studies consistently show that agents 
voluntarily donate more to public goods than would be predicted by the standard 
model set out in Bergstrom, Blume and Varian (BBV) (1986).  This classic paper, the 
foundation for a large body of subsequent work, takes the final provision of a public 
good to be the outcome of a Nash equilibrium.  To explain the anomaly two 
theoretical strategies have been developed.  Firstly, we have the ‘warm glow’ 
(Andreoni (1990)) which takes individuals to gain utility from the very act of 
donating.  This preserves the idea of a Nash equilibrium, but changes individual 
motivation.  Secondly, donations might stem from some social convention based on 
reciprocity (Sugden (1984), Benchekroun and Van Long (2008)).   Here individuals 
contribute to the public good under the expectation that others will do the same, the 
expectation itself reflecting some form of social capital.  This is trust at a societal 
level, as individuals feel under some obligation to conform to social norms.  It takes 
us away from simple Nash equilibrium.    
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The origin of trust in this sense has been debated for a long time, going back at least 
to 18th century Italian and Scottish writers (Bruno and Sugden (2000)).  Levati (2006) 
and Woersdorfer (2010) provide differing modern treatments of this question, and 
make extensive references to the modern literature.  In this paper, by contrast, we 
consider a form of reciprocity stemming from trust at the individual, not societal, 
level.  That is, individuals trust individuals known to them, but not others.  This form 
of trust is surely one feature of “social capital”, and may indeed be a vital part of any 
story in which trust emerges spontaneously within society.  However, for the purpose 
of the exercise to follow, trust is taken as given.  Individual motivation lies solely in 
the provision of the public good (no warm glow).  Trust is just an instrument for 
achieving a desirable provision of the same.  Hence, reciprocity is assumed to operate 
only within a most likely small sub-group of the economy, not as a general social 
norm.  Starting with the foundation model (BBV), recall that with a Nash equilibrium 
agents either cannot communicate with one another or cannot credibly pre-commit to 
any particular action.  Contrast this with the standard definition of trust given by 
Sapienza et al. quoting Gambetta (2000): “When we say we trust someone or that 
someone is trustworthy we implicitly mean that the probability that he will perform an 
action that is beneficial [to us] is high enough for us to consider engaging in some 
form of co-operation with him.”  Clearly, then, in the foundation model there is no 
trust.  This raises an obvious question: how much trust do we need in order for total 
donations to rise above the Nash level and for the foundation model to be 
undermined?  This is the key question we try to answer. 
Our first problem is that of measuring trust.  We adopt a simple approach.  Note that 
the quotation above has two sides: I am trusting in that I believe someone will 
perform some action when she says she will; and that person is trustworthy if she does 
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in fact perform an action when she says (promises) that she will.  In consequence we 
have a minimum (non-zero) level of “trust” in an economy if exactly two individuals 
exist who both trust one another and who are both trustworthy.  If we add a third 
trusted and trustworthy person to this group aggregate trust increases (by one unit if 
we like).  Trust similarly increases if we add a fourth individual to the group, and so 
on.  We assume just one group of mutually trusting people within society.  We 
assume individuals to be identical in all respects, that members of this group agree 
that each will contribute a given amount to the public good, and finally that all 
contribute what was promised.  Hence the group would be unanimous in deciding on 
its overall contribution, and our question becomes this: how large would such a group 
have to be in order for total donations to the public good to rise above the Nash level?    
There are two papers which relate closely to our argument.  The first, Buchholz, 
Haslbeck and Sandler (BHS) (1998), posed the same question.  Assuming a fixed but 
small group of individuals who can co-ordinate their donations (who in our terms trust 
one another), they found two conditions under which such a group might gain from so 
doing: firstly, agents outside the potential group must have implausibly high marginal 
propensities to consume the public good; and, secondly, the size of the trusting group 
has to be implausibly large.  They conclude that partial co-operation in the sense 
assumed here is unlikely.  By contrast, in this paper, with qualifications, we reach 
conclusions that are almost exactly the reverse.  The second paper, Buchholz, Cornes 
and Ruebbelke (BCR) (2014), undertakes a very thorough analysis of what might 
happen if there is a given single co-operating group within a community.  Here co-
operation, or in our terms trust, is characterised by ‘matching’, by which each co-
operating agent provides a quantity of the public good to match the base donation 
made by each co-operator.  The consequence of this is to alter (usually lower) the 
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perceived price of the public good to each co-operating agent.  There are three 
possible types of equilibrium: (a) the co-operating group and the outside group of 
non-co-operators both donate to the public good; (b) only the co-operating group 
donates; (c) only outside agents donate.  The last of these comes about through the co-
operating group deciding to cut their donations to zero and so gain from free-riding on 
the resulting increased donations of the outside group.  In general there is no reason to 
suppose that the Nash outcome (zero matching) is what the trusting group will choose.  
However, two questions are left somewhat open in their analysis: (a) what size is a 
viable co-operating group likely to be; (b) what are the circumstances under which we 
might expect one type of equilibrium rather than another to emerge?  In what follows 
we attempt to provide partial answers.  
We set out our main argument diagrammatically in the next section.  Formal analysis 
is presented in section 2, and extended in section 3.  Comments and conclusions are 
given in the final section. 
 
1. The basic argument 
The basis of our argument can be found by looking at Figure 1, derived from Cornes 
and Sandler (1989).  Assume an economy of individuals who are in all respects 
identical.  Andreoni (1988) shows that with a sufficiently large number of individuals 
only those of a particular type can be expected to donate to the public good.  This type 
would typically be individuals who are wealthier and/or have a stronger taste for the 
public good.  If we bear in mind that we are dealing only with this type of person our 
assumption that agents are homogenous is not as restrictive as it might appear.  There 
is a private good x and a public good G.  We assume a constant cost economy with 
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units of both goods chosen such that the price of each is unity.  The individual income 
expansion path is drawn on Figure 1 and intersects the vertical line drawn where x = 
M at point L, M being individual income.  In this model, under the conditions of BBV, 
a unique equilibrium exists and agents all donate the same amount to the public good.  
Diagrammatically, equilibrium for any n is found when the symmetry line MC (G = 
n(M – x)) intersects the income expansion path at point A (Ignore the indifference 
curve for the moment).  Clearly, as n increases, the line MC pivots clockwise, and G 
and x both increase as does individual utility.  The equilibrium point approaches L as 
n goes to infinity.  In what follows we assume a large economy, and take individual 
utility without co-ordination to be that at point L.  Again, this is not as restrictive as it 
appears: the pivot of line MC on Figure 1 is greatest when n is small which suggests 
that convergence to point L is likely to be fast.1     
Now imagine that there is a group of m mutually trusting individuals, able to co-
ordinate fully their donations to the public good, as described earlier.  They all agree 
amongst themselves to donate a given (equal) amount to G.  If so, under the 
assumption that the rest of community donates nothing, the implicit budget constraint 
each person faces will be M = x + m-1G.  Replacing n by m this now appears on 
Figure 1 as the line MC.  As shown, our group would be just willing to co-ordinate 
their contributions.  From the diagram, it is clear that they will only gain if the group 
is large enough, i.e. MC is steep enough.  If so, the provision of public good must 
increase above that at point L.  Agents outside the group will donate nothing2.  Thus 
the effective price of the public good to a group member does indeed become m-1, the 
Lindahl price within the group.  Recall that the price of provision is unity.  Hence, the 
level of public good provision will be determined by standard individual utility 
maximisation, with the equation M = x + m-1G, described by line MC, being each 
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group member’s budget constraint.  Clearly, as m increases the price of the public 
good to an individual group member falls, and provision of G by the group rises.  The 
path taken would be traced out by the price expansion curve on the diagram (not 
drawn).  The critical question we address is this: at what level of m does the utility of 
donating within such a group exceed the limit utility at point L?    
The critical point on Figure 1 is B.3  To find the minimum size of group we find the 
(slope of that) symmetry line which is tangential to the limit indifference curve, and 
then take the smallest integer at least as large as this value, m*.  Our diagram, of 
course, cannot tell us how large or small m* has to be.  It can, though, suggest 
determining factors.  Firstly, the location of L seems relevant, the lower it is the lower 
m* is likely to be.  To see this, just take any indifference curve, and shift it 
downwards vertically on the diagram.  This would typically raise the importance of x 
in individual consumption.  If so, with a given marginal willingness to pay, the limit 
provision of G would be lower, and fewer trusting individuals would be required to 
achieve a higher provision.  Thus, contrary to BHS, who deal with marginal changes 
in public good contributions, we can expect the critical size of group to vary inversely 
with respect to the weight of private consumption in individual preferences.  We call 
the impact of a lower limit point “Effect One”.  Secondly, suppose that point L and 
the MRS there remain unchanged, but that the curvature of the indifference curve 
diminishes.  The tangency point will now be on a symmetry line with a gentler slope 
(above L) with a lower m and possibly m*.  We call the impact of a gentler slope for 
the limit indifference curve “Effect Two”4.  One way to explain would be to say that, 
locally, agents now place a higher relative value on the public good.  Finally, it is 
worth recalling that when m increases we get a greater pivot (greater marginal benefit 
from cost sharing) from the first individuals to join the group, and that this marginal 
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benefit decreases rapidly with m.  This suggests that the required number of co-
operators might actually be rather small.  
Note that the key comparison here is between points B and L, which do not lie in the 
same neighbourhood.  To proceed we must therefore specify an individual utility 
function.  The constant elasticity of substitution (CES) utility function seems a natural 
choice.  It incorporates the Cobb-Douglas as a special case and provides a convenient 
way to examine the impact of increased substitutability between x and G.  However, 
as we shall find in the next section, which investigates how well our conjectures stand 
up to formal analysis, there are subtleties to be dealt with in the way in which 
changing the elasticity of substitution () changes the slope of the indifference curves. 
 
2. The CES Utility Function 
We assume each individual maximises: 
 𝑈 = (𝑎𝑥−𝜌 + (1 − 𝑎)𝐺−𝜌)
−
1
𝜌 
Here a ∈ (0, 1) captures the importance of x in individual preferences, and 𝜎 =
1
𝜌+1
 is 
the elasticity of substitution.  From the conjectures given in section 1 these are the 
parameters of particular interest.  Suppose the individual faces the standard budget 
constraint M = x + pG (just for the moment treat G as a private good and suspend the 
unit normalisation).  By following standard procedures the demand functions for x 
and G are given by: 
𝐺 =
𝑀(1 − 𝑎)𝜎𝑝−𝜎
𝑎𝜎 + (1 − 𝑎)𝜎𝑝1−𝜎
            𝑥 =
𝑀𝑎𝜎
𝑎𝜎 + (1 − 𝑎)𝜎𝑝1−𝜎
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Given that the marginal rate of substitution (MRSGx = −
𝑑𝑥
𝑑𝐺
) is equal to 
1−𝑎
𝑎
(
𝑥
𝐺
)
1
𝜎
= 𝑝,     
at the limit point L on Figure 1 consumption is given by the equations: 
xL =M   𝐺𝐿 = 𝑀 (
1−𝑎
𝑝𝑎
)
𝜎
   (1) 
Hence limit utility is: 
 𝑈𝐿 = 𝑀(𝑎 + (1 − 𝑎)
𝜎(𝑝𝑎)1−𝜎)
𝜎
𝜎−1.      (2) 
The derivative of the marginal rate of substitution with respect to  at any 
consumption point is given by: 
𝜕𝑀𝑅𝑆𝐺𝑥
𝜕𝜎
= −
1−𝑎
𝑎
(
𝑥
𝐺
)
1
𝜎 1
𝜎2
ln(𝑥
𝐺
)   
Taking the sign of − ln(𝑥
𝐺
), this is negative if and only if x > G.  Hence, below the 45o 
line from the origin on Figure 1, a rise in the elasticity of substitution at any point 
would cause the new indifference curve to pivot clockwise.  Above the line the 
reverse is the case, so overall indifference curves flatten using the point where x 
equals G as a fulcrum.  Note too that with the normalisation restored if a > ½ GL < M.  
Hence if  rises GL will fall and the indifference curve at the original limit point will 
become steeper.  The two effects isolated in section 1 work against one another.  For a 
< ½ the two effects again work against one another but with roles reversed.  These 
properties help us understand the propositions that follow. 
With the supply price (p) of the public good fixed at unity we now find the utility for 
members of a mutually trusting group size of size m.  Recall from section 1 that if this 
group co-operates in order to provide the public good donations by the rest of the 
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community will be zero.  Within the group people, being identical, will be unanimous 
about the quantity of G to be provided.  Given their trust in one another each takes the 
price of the public good to be m-1 and the consequent utility maximising quantity of G 
will be the agreed provision by the group.  Thus to find the level of G and x consumed 
simply substitute this into the demand equations: 
𝐺 =
𝑀(1 − 𝑎)𝜎( 1𝑚)
−𝜎
𝑎𝜎 + (1 − 𝑎)𝜎( 1𝑚)
1−𝜎                     𝑥 =
𝑀𝑎𝜎
𝑎𝜎 + (1 − 𝑎)𝜎( 1𝑚)
1−𝜎 
Substitute these expressions into the utility function:  
𝑈(𝑚)= 𝑀 {𝑎𝜎 + (1 − 𝑎)𝜎( 1
𝑚
)
1−𝜎
}
1
𝜎−1
    (3) 
From Figure 1 we find the minimum size of group by equating the utility at point L 
(UL) with utility at point B (U(m)).  Solving for m yields: 
 𝑚 = [
(𝑎+(1−𝑎)𝜎(𝑎)1−𝜎)
𝜎
−𝑎𝜎
(1−𝑎)𝜎
]
1
𝜎−1
     (4) 
If m is not an integer simply take the lowest integer greater than m to find m*.  This 
gives us the minimum size of co-operative group that would be willing to form in a 
large economy, given that the alternative is simple Nash equilibrium.  To proceed we 
first establish some key properties of the m function.  We then illustrate for various 
parameter values the number of members a trusting group would require if members 
are to benefit by co-ordinating donations. 
Property 1 
𝜕𝑚
𝜕𝑎
< 0 
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Proof 
Given that 𝑚 = [
(𝑎+(1−𝑎)𝜎(𝑎)1−𝜎)
𝜎
−𝑎𝜎
(1−𝑎)𝜎
]
1
𝜎−1
, define the term in square brackets as y, so 
that m = 𝑦
1
𝜎−1.  Also define 𝑧 = 𝑎
1−𝑎
 so that 𝑦 = [(𝑧 + 𝑧1−𝜎)𝜎 − 𝑧𝜎].   
As 
𝑑𝑧
𝑑𝑎
> 0, we can evaluate the derivative of m with respect to a using z.  Given that: 
 
𝑑𝑚
𝑑𝑧
= 1
𝜎−1
𝑦
2−𝜎
𝜎−1
𝑑𝑦
𝑑𝑧
  
The sign of the derivative depends on whether  is greater or less than unity together 
with the sign of  
𝑑𝑦
𝑑𝑧
.   
 
𝑑𝑦
𝑑𝑧
= 𝜎(𝑧 + 𝑧1−𝜎)𝜎−1(1 + (1 − 𝜎)𝑧−𝜎) − 𝜎𝑧𝜎−1 
 = 𝜎𝑧𝜎−1[(1 + 𝑧−𝜎)𝜎−1(1 + (1 − 𝜎)𝑧−𝜎) − 1] 
Hence: 
 
𝑑𝑦
𝑑𝑧
≷ 0 as (1+(1−𝜎)𝑧
−𝜎)
(1+𝑧−𝜎)1−𝜎
≷ 1 
Now employing a second order Taylor expansion on the function 𝑓(𝑧−𝜎) =
(1 + 𝑧−𝜎)1−𝜎 we have: 
 (1 + 𝑧−𝜎)1−𝜎 = 1 + (1 − 𝜎)𝑧−𝜎 − 𝜎(1 − 𝜎)1
2
(1 + 𝑧−?̃?)−(𝜎+1)𝑧−2𝜎 
where 𝑧−?̃? ∈ (0, 𝑧−𝜎), and suitably valued.  It follows from this that: 
 
(1+(1−𝜎)𝑧−𝜎)
(1+𝑧−𝜎)1−𝜎
> 1 if with(1+(1−𝜎)𝑧
−𝜎)
(1+𝑧−𝜎)1−𝜎
< 1 if .   
In both cases it follows that 
𝑑𝑚
𝑑𝑧
  (or  
𝜕𝑚
𝜕𝑎
) < 0.    Q.E.D. 
A rise in a will always lower GL.  The diagrammatic explanation is that a rise in a 
causes the MRSGx to fall (indifference curves to become steeper on Figure 1).  Given 
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normality the new limit point at which MRSGx = 1 must therefore lie below the old 
one.  This confirms our earlier conjecture that the more tastes are directed towards the 
private good the lower the number of people needed to form a co-operative coalition 
to provide the public good.  Given the smaller provision of G in the Nash equilibrium 
fewer mutually trusting people are needed to co-ordinate their donations so as to 
increase their utility.  The role of is more complicated, but is partially dealt with by 
the next properties. 
Property 2 
As 𝜎 goes to zero required group size m goes to infinity. 
From equation (1), as 𝜎 → 0, 𝐺𝐿 → 𝑀.  (Remember p = 1.)  is the case of perfect 
complements, so here point B will approach point L and the slope of the line MC will 
become a vertical line.  Hence m goes to infinity.  The economic explanation for this 
result seems to lie in the fact that with perfect complements the Nash equilibrium is 
Pareto optimal.  With a low  we are already close to Pareto optimality, and the 
potential gains from co-ordination are correspondingly limited.  A viable trusting 
group would have to be very large. 
Property 3 
As 𝜎 goes to infinity required group membership goes to: 
(a) Infinity if a < 0.5 
(b) 2 if a = 0.5 
(a) From eq. (1) as  → ∞ GL → ∞.  At the limit the goods are perfect substitutes.  
Now consider an artificial value of m, m", determined by using the slope of the 
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tangent to the indifference curve at GL
 (equals unity for any , rather than the 
indifference curve itself.  m" is found as the slope of the line linking point M 
to the point at which the tangent hits the G axis.  Clearly, m" ≤  m for all 
values of .  As GL goes to infinity so too will m" and therefore m and m*.  
Clearly, if GL → ∞ Effect One must ultimately dominate Effect Two even 
when the latter works to diminish m, as it must for GL > M. 
(b) From (1) a = 0.5 implies GL = M for all   The limit indifference curve going 
through point L will be a straight line with slope minus one (perfect 
substitutes).  This will hit the vertical axis at G = 2M, which implies a limit 
value of m of 2.  Here only Effect Two operates and as it will do so only in the 
area of Figure 1 above the 45o line it must cause m to fall. 
The empirically interesting case of 1 > a > 0.5 is not so straightforward.  The limit 
indifference map, of course, is that of perfect substitutes, straight line indifference 
curves with MRSGx = a
-1(1 – a).  In this case 𝑚 = 𝑎
1−𝑎
 (the slope of corresponding 
indifference curves we would draw on Figure 1) which will be high for high values of 
a.  However, as against this GL is converging to zero as  increases, and the MRSGx at 
the L naturally remains at unity along this path which may result in large rises in m 
only occurring at very high values of .  Effects One and Two work against one 
another, so we have to resort to computation to find out which is the stronger, 
particularly for the more plausible values of the parameters.  We now turn to this task. 
On Figure 2 we draw the surface of the m function for values of the elasticity of 
substitution up to 2.  The picture illustrates our formal analysis of the m equation.  For 
a < 0.5 we see that, as expected, m falls and then rises as  rises.  The diagram also 
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shows an inverse relationship between m and  when a > 0.5, although the change in 
m is not great once the elasticity of substitution reaches about 0.5.   On Figure 3 we 
extend the range of .  The change in scale suppresses some of the detail at the edge 
of the diagram (compare the vertical scale for m in both diagrams).  The main feature 
to observe is the lack of feature in the bulk of the diagram (also apparent on Figure 2).  
Clearly in the ‘flat’ portion of the diagram, which encompasses reasonably plausible 
values of the parameters, m* does not vary by very much.  In the case of the high 
values of  illustrated, Effect One offsets Effect Two.  It would appear therefore that 
for the impact of these effects to be reversed  would have to be very high5. 
To see what size of group would be needed to deliver what in fact will be a Pareto 
improving quantity of the public good consult Figure 4.  Here we see the minimum 
value for a consistent with individuals being willing to form groups of sizes 2, 3, 5, 8, 
10.  All of these might be thought of as relatively ‘small’.   Given that 
𝜕𝑚
𝜕𝑎
< 0 any 
coalition with a size above those indicated on the diagram would willingly provide the 
public good.  It is unlikely that people to want to spend a large fraction of their 
income on the public good, almost certainly well below 50% (a > 0.5).  As the 
diagram shows, except for very low values of  we can expect a trusting group of size 
10 to form.   
If there is a moderate degree of substitutability (2), supposing a = 0.9 a group of 3 
suffices.  The flat area of Figures 2 and 3 in fact corresponds roughly to points where 
m* equals 3.  If  is sufficiently (but not excessively) high it is possible that only two 
people (minimum trust) is necessary.  Broadly speaking our simulation matches the 
conjectures we made in section 1.  The preliminary conclusion is that for a wide range 
of plausible values for the key parameters of the model, a group of just three 
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individuals would be willing to provide the public good.  In this sense three, or 
possibly even two, is a ‘crowd’!6 
 
3. Two Extensions  
We now consider two extensions to the analysis of section 2.   
 
(a) Non-homothetic utility functions 
 
As explained in section 1, the CES utility function is a natural one to use when 
analysing the question of trust, given the likely role of the elasticity of substitution in 
determining the minimum viable size of co-operating group.  Nevertheless, in spite of 
its advantages, it is somewhat restrictive.  To see what difference non-homotheticity 
makes to our results we now consider a wider class of utility functions.   
First, take the simple case of quasi-linear utility: U = v(x) + G.  Here the whole of the 
income effect goes to G, with the income expansion path in Figure 1 being vertical 
(we assume M is sufficiently large to avoid corner solutions).   By adapting our earlier 
diagrammatic exercise it is easy to see that as community size increases without limit 
G goes to infinity.  As n increases GL also increases without limit.  Hence, the 
minimum size of group (m) likewise goes to infinity as n increases.  Thus for the large 
economy we assume, the numbers required for a co-operating group to want to form 
become very large.  The Nash equilibrium is now robust.  The same conclusion holds 
whenever there is no finite limit to G. That is, whenever the income expansion path 
on Figure 1 fails to cross the vertical line from point M we will have the same result.  
While a clear counter-example to the conclusion of the previous section this is not 
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empirically plausible.  It assumes a zero or negligible income effect on the private 
good and therefore a low weight for x at high incomes.   
Our second example makes the opposite assumption: U = x + v(G).  Now there is a 
zero income effect on G.  Although again rather special, this type of utility function is 
more plausible and is used quite often in public economics.  The income expansion 
path on Figure 1 is now a horizontal line and the earlier analysis applies.  Consider the 
function U = x + G  By following the same procedure, equating the 
limit utility to the “Lindahl” utility when there are m co-operators and solving for m, it 
can be shown7 that the formula for the minimum size of group is 𝑚 = (1 − 𝛼)−
1−𝛼
𝛼 .  
This translates to integer values for m of 2 or 3 with 2 being for the higher values of 
.  Our earlier conclusions continue to hold. 
Now consider a generalisation of the CES utility function: 𝑈 = [𝑎(𝑥 − 𝛽1)
−𝜌 +
(1 − 𝑎)(𝐺 − 𝛽2)
−𝜌]−
1
𝜌 .  A special case of this is the Stone-Geary function, widely 
used in empirical work, where or  = 1.  Unfortunately, this example is more 
complicated.  Following the familiar procedures, the solution for m is given (in 
implicit functional form) by the equation: 
𝑓 = (𝑀 − 𝛽1 −
𝛽2
𝑚
) {𝑎𝜎 + (1 − 𝑎)𝜎 (
1
𝑚
)
1−𝜎
}
1
𝜎−1
− (𝑀 − 𝛽1)[𝑎 + (1 − 𝑎)
𝜎𝑎1−𝜎]
𝜎
𝜎−1 
= 0 
There is no general analytic solution for m. However, one or two comments can be 
made before presenting some simulations.   
 The derivative of the first expression of f with respect to m is positive, so for 
any set of parameters there is a unique value for m. 
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 If  there remains just one m in the equation.  In this case the equation 
can be solved.  It is not difficult to show that the solution is the same as in 
section 2, so all properties found there continue to hold.  With  M has a 
direct effect on m, in contrast to previous examples.   
 Given that the derivative of f with respect to is negative it follows that 
𝜕𝑚
𝜕𝛽2
> 0.   This relates to an earlier argument.  Raising  shifts the 
indifference curves up vertically on Figure 1, making G in some sense more 
important in individual consumption (Effect One), and therefore raising the 
minimal size of trusting group.  This means that we must expect group size to 
be higher than in Section 2. 
 The final comment concerns a, which as before indicates the weighting of the 
private good in (non-subsistence) consumption.  Now, in contrast to the 
original CES case, we find that m does not decline monotonically when a 
rises.  For a sufficiently high m rises with a and in fact approaches infinity as 
a approaches unity.  The explanation for this lies in the fact that now the limit 
value of G approaches not zero.  Indifference curves become vertical above 
G = .  This means we approach a situation akin to perfect complements, 
which we know from Section 2 causes the critical size of the trusting group to 
approach infinity.  There is, though, a slight element of implausibility in the 
situation described.  The quantity  of the public good is in some sense vital 
to individuals, and yet production of G beyond this point delivers very little 
extra benefit. 
The significance of the last point depends on how high a has to be for m to be 
excessively high.  To answer this question we need examples.  This is our next task.  
17 
 
In doing this we note that in the above equation it is not so much M that is of 
importance but the difference between M and the terms.  Recall that from 
Andreoni’s findings the individuals we are dealing with are likely to be among the 
wealthier members of society perhaps with a strong preference for the public good.  
Accepting this, it is reasonable to suppose that the terms are comparatively small in 
relation to M.  For this reason our favoured simulations assume: M = 100; 
 The ’s are small compared to M, but not too small, 
thus avoiding similarity to findings of Section 2.   Figures 5, 6, and 7 show how the 
minimum size of group changes with a for four possible values of .   Outcomes 
where group size is much above 20 have been suppressed in order to show the basic 
pattern which is much the same across the diagrams.  The functions are now U-
shaped, this being more pronounced the higher is   The large “flat” area for m has 
shrunk noticeably for high values of , and in this case is restricted to values of a 
between 0.45 and 0.95.  In some cases 2 or 3 individuals suffice for a viable group, 
but generally the numbers required are between 5 and 7, still reasonably low.  a has to 
be quite high for m to be really large except for when is high. 
To see the impact of a higher value for  consider Figure 8, which is drawn for 
30, M = 100 and values for  of 0.5, 1, 2, and 10.    A comparison of 
Figures 7 and 8 shows that the general difference between the corresponding 
functions is not great.  The functions are again U-shaped, being flatter the lower is , 
with minima between a = 0.5 and a = 0.8.  As with the C.E.S. function the schedules 
take high values for a low (not illustrated), although this has to be very low with low 
.  With a high  (= 10) a itself has to be high (0.45) before m reaches a realistic 
level.  Is three still a crowd?  The answer generally is no.  As expected, with a higher 
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value for m rises and with  = 0.5 is fairly constant at 10.  For high values of  m 
can be significantly lower even reaching three for  = 10 around about the value a = 
0.6.  If we (arbitrarily) take 10 to be a maximum number for a viable co-operating 
group then for most cases illustrated we could expect such a group to form as long as 
a < 0.95.  Even though this is not so favourable to undermining the Nash equilibrium 
as in Section 2 this is still very likely to happen if we bear in mind that the individuals 
we study are among the wealthier and/or more motivated members of the whole 
community. 
 
(b) The Commons 
Our second extension of the analysis of section 2 deals with a commons type of public 
good.  This is particularly significant in the environmental context.  Here individuals’ 
private consumption damages some facility providing a public benefit, as for example 
with noise pollution.  We assume that the only way to alleviate the problem is to 
restrict individual consumption.  This question has been examined by Vicary (2011) 
in such a way as to draw comparison with the standard “subscription” type of public 
good that has, thus far, been the focus of our attention.  The main general conclusion 
is that commons public good models have a sort of “skew-symmetric” relationship 
with the key subscription model.  We illustrate this here with a simple model related 
to Vicary (2009) and illustrate another such feature. 
Assume a “Garden of Eden” level of public good provision, ?̅?.  Assume two private 
goods, x which is environmentally neutral, and y for which each unit of consumption 
lowers the provision of G by an amount .  Each individual i is interested in their 
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overall consumption zi = axi + byi , and G.  Our identical individuals all solve the 
same utility maximisation problem: 
Max Ui= Ui(zi, G)  
subject to  Mi = xi + pyi  
Both x and y are delivered at constant cost (unity and p respectively).  To ensure that 
individuals will want to consume good y we also assume b > ap.  Take G-i to be the 
initial provision of G, before i makes his/her consumption decision.  Hence the 
equation G = G-i - yi tells i the impact of his/her consumption of y on G.  By using 
the budget constraint to eliminate x from the z equation and then using the equation 
for G to eliminate y we can recast the individual utility maximisation problem as: 
 Max Ui = Ui(zi, G)  
 Subject to 𝑀𝑖 + (
𝑏−𝑎𝑝
𝛽𝑎
) 𝐺−𝑖 = (
1
𝑎
)𝑧𝑖 + (
𝑏−𝑎𝑝
𝛽𝑎
) 𝐺 
The budget equation here appears as the line aMA on Figure 9.  Note the minimum 
level of z is consumed when z = ax = aM, and the maximum when z = bMp-1.  As G-i 
falls the budget line shifts downwards and the Income Expansion Path (IEP) traces 
out the locus of tangencies with the individual’s indifference curves (not drawn).   
Now assume all agents are identical in all respects.  This means that they will all 
make the same (unco-ordinated) decisions. Hence they all consume the same amount 
of x and y and therefore of z.  It can be shown that if this is so the line of symmetry is 
given by: 
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 𝐺 = ( 𝛽𝑛𝑎
𝑏−𝑎𝑝
) 𝑀 +  ?̅? − ( 𝛽𝑛
𝑏−𝑎𝑝
) 𝑧 
 
This is the line aMB that appears on Figure 9.  Equilibrium is therefore found at point 
Q.  Note that if z = aM (no y consumption) this equation reduces to 𝐺 = ?̅? so that 
increasing n pivots the line MB clockwise around the point (𝑎𝑀, ?̅?).   The 
consequence is that the limit point as n goes to infinity is L, with G falling, not rising, 
with n.   Also note that we could imagine, following Andreoni, that the economy is 
composed of individuals of differing types, each having their own income expansion 
path and limit point.  Suppose a finite number of types with individuals being added 
one by one with type according to underlying probabilities.  As n, the number of 
individuals in the economy, goes to infinity the provision of G will with probability 
one converge to the limit point of the type with the least (not most) interest in the 
public good. 
In a large economy, then, what are the chances of partial co-operation achieving a 
(Pareto) improvement?  The answer is simple: very little.  Close to the limit agents 
either consume x only and do no environmental damage, or, if members are of one 
particular type, do very little damage individually but a large amount collectively.  
Were a few of these people to agree together to cut y consumption they would achieve 
little.  Partly this is because a small group would have been doing little damage in the 
first place.  However, even this would probably largely be offset by the reaction of the 
rest of the community.  If G does rise as a result, the level of G-i will rise for other 
agents, who would then react by increasing their y consumption.  More precisely, 
suppose agents are identical in all relevant respects, and suppose there is a small 
group, m, of mutually trusting individuals.  Suppose the economy starts at Q, taking n 
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to be large.  For the small group the individualised price of the public good is now 
lower and, assuming zero reaction on the part of the rest of the economy, each 
individual member will face a budget line starting at Q and moving up and to the left 
steeper than the initial budget line.  Suppose this group decides to consume only x 
(choosing the end point on the vertical line down from aM).  Final (now Stackelberg) 
equilibrium, allowing for the reaction of the rest of the economy, will be found as 
before only with a symmetry line pivoted anti-clockwise from aMB.  If n is large and 
m is small the pivot will be minimal.  The new consumption point of group members 
would involve a (most likely small) rise in G as a result of their cut in z.  Suppose now 
our group just lowers y consumption.  This would lower the effective value of ?̅? for 
the rest of the community in comparison to the previous example.  The modified 
symmetry line will have the same slope as in the previous case but with a lower 
intercept.  Provision of G falls below that in which the co-operating group chooses y 
= 0, but is still above provision at Q.  Trusting individuals suffer a (lower) loss of z 
and in return enjoy a smaller gain in G.  By varying their z consumption and 
accounting for the response by non-group members we could construct a budget line 
for the group.  The group is viable if this goes above the initial indifference curve.  
However, there is no need to pursue the exercise further as the argument is effectively 
the same as BHS (1998) (see their Figure 1)8.   Their pessimistic conclusions follow.  
To summarise, with a commons the conditions for a viable trusting group are difficult 
to achieve.  In contrast, even allowing for the slightly less favourable findings of the 
previous sub-section, in many plausible circumstances we should not be surprised to 
find co-operative groups forming when the public good is of a subscription nature.  
This is another instance of the two cases being skew-symmetric with respect to one 
another.     
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4. Conclusion 
The main overall conclusion to take from our analysis is that the properties of the 
foundation model are not robust with respect to the degree of trust within an 
economy.  We supplement this statement with three observations. 
Why are our findings so much at variance with those of BHS?  The answer lies in the 
fact that they kept to the assumption of an internal solution for donations by 
individuals outside the group.  Once it is possible for individuals in a co-operating 
group to achieve a utility above that at point L on Figure 1 donations by the rest of the 
community must be forced down to zero.  At this point it would be impossible for the 
rest of the community to offset the extra donations by the co-operating group.  Bear in 
mind too that when a, (measuring the importance of the private good in individual 
consumption) is high, GL, is low.  Indeed for a > 0.5 total community expenditure on 
the public good in the BBV model is less than individual income, possibly very 
substantially so.  In the light of this observation, together with the substantial cost 
saving from having just a few individuals co-ordinating their donations, the fact that a 
small group of agents might gain from co-ordinating their efforts comes as less of a 
surprise.   
Secondly, note that BCR do not use the limit point L.  Our argument still applies, 
though, as can easily be seen from further inspection of Figure 1.  With a finite 
economy the initial Nash equilibrium lies on the income expansion path below and to 
the left of L.  If point B is available, it will be preferable for the trusting group.  
Indeed, in any final equilibrium in which outside agents donate to the public good, G 
must be less than at L with the utility of the co-operators being lower than at B.  It 
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follows that once B or anything better is available the only type of final equilibrium 
we would observe is one in which outsiders do not donate.  For this, a group of three 
usually suffices when agents have a CES utility function.  A higher, but still relatively 
small, number would be required for many of the cases examined in section 3.   
Finally, consider the international context that both BHS and BCR had in mind.   
Numbers are likely to be fewer than assumed here and the degree of trust may be 
lower9.  More to the point, many international public goods, such as the question of 
global warming, are better described as commons public goods.  While both types of 
good are subject to prisoner dilemma problems the characteristics of equilibrium 
when action is not co-ordinated differ as between the two cases.   Agents can always 
increase the damage they do, rather than cut their donations.  This means that the 
assumption of an internal utility maximisation solution for individuals outside the co-
operating group, as used by BHS, is now plausible.  Hence with a commons, the 
scope for partial co-operation is much less, and their conclusions continue to hold.   
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Footnotes 
*I am very grateful to the referees for valuable comments on earlier versions of this 
paper. 
1. The focus on point L distinguishes our analysis from that of Buchholz, Cornes 
and Ruebbelke (2014).  This is not a matter of great importance, as explained 
in the conclusion.  
2. We are therefore trying find conditions under which outside agents contribute 
nothing.  Taking the co-operating group to be one agent, this outcome could 
be thought of as either a Nash or a Stackelberg equilibrium.  
3.  Up to this point the argument is simply a graphical account of Proposition 7 
in Buchholz et al (2014). 
4. I am very grateful to a referee for suggesting this distinction. 
5. The packages used for computing (Excel and Matlab) were not able to find a 
case of a rise in  causing a rise in m when a was more than ½.  This seems to 
have been caused by the fact that certain values required in the calculations 
came too close to zero. 
6. In Benchekroun and Van Long’s dynamic model one possible solution is for 
the economy to be stuck at the static Nash equilibrium indefinitely, with 
‘social capital’ being zero (2008; page 244).  Although they do not deal with 
direct co-ordination between agents, our argument suggests that if we suppose 
the personal trust we have examined here translates into some positive amount 
of social capital (people might simply observe G, not individual behaviour) 
this solution to their model might in practice be unstable.  Social capital would 
subsequently grow to a higher level through the mechanism they analyse.   
7. Derivations for Section 3 are given in an appendix available at 
http://eprint.ncl.ac.uk/pub_details2.aspx?pub_id=231695 
8. One difference is that the number of outsiders causing damage may not be 
fixed: other types might be induced to increase their y consumption above zero 
if co-operators lower their own y.  This simply strengthens their original 
conclusions. 
9. David Hume, who provided us with one of the earliest recognisably modern 
treatments of trust, indeed suggested (Treatise of Human Nature, Book 3 
section 11) that conventional rules of morality have less force in an 
international context.   
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